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Abstract
This article comments on the recent study “CEO hubris and firm pollution: state and market contingencies in a transitional 
economy” of Zhang et al. (J Bus Ethics 161(2):459–478, 2020) in this journal. We very much appreciate the valuable ini-
tiative of Zhang et al. to study the potential effect of CEO characteristics on corporate pollution. At the same time, we are 
concerned with the authors’ interpretation of the regression results and their operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to 
contribute to the literature on managerial hubris in two ways. First, we repair the authors’ inferences and conclusions about 
the actual effect of CEO hubris on firm pollution with respect to their conflicting regression results. Second, we unpack and 
clarify the authors’ vulnerable operationalization of CEO hubris. We hope to stimulate more research on (1) the (tricky) 
relationship between CEO hubris and firm pollution, and (2) managerial hubris more generally through a more rigorous 
operationalization and measurement of hubris.
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Introduction
In their recent article “CEO Hubris and Firm Pollution: 
State and Market Contingencies in a Transitional Economy,” 
Zhang et al. (2020) in this journal study the effect of CEO 
hubris on firm pollution in China. They conclude that “CEO 
hubris significantly leads to more firm pollution” (2020, p. 
474). Because firm pollution bears severe negative conse-
quences (e.g., Heft-Neal et al. 2018; Li et al. 2019; Waller 
2018), their study is highly relevant and worth noting care-
fully (e.g., Jia et al. 2016; Li and Zhou 2017). Drawing on 
the author’s regression analyses (see their Tables 4, 5, and 
6), however, we question their central conclusion and the 
inferences made. In the remainder of this commentary, we 
revisit the author’s research framework, regression results, 
and operationalization of hubris. We wish to inspire more 
research (Mishina et al. 2010) on the relationship between 
CEO hubris (e.g., Hiller and Hambrick 2005) and unethical 
or illegal behavior in organizations (e.g., Graffin et al. 2013).
Hypothesized Relationship Between CEO 
Hubris and Firm Pollution
Drawing on existing literature, Zhang et al. (2020) propose 
their first and central Hypothesis 1 on page 462: “CEO 
hubris is positively related to firm pollution.” Hence, their 
research framework (see their Fig. 1) includes one independ-
ent variable, i.e., CEO hubris, and one dependent variable, 
i.e., firm pollution. They develop three additional hypoth-
eses, which are concerned with three proposed moderating 
variables (see their Fig. 1): state ownership (Hypothesis 2), 
political connection (Hypothesis 3), and industrial competi-
tion (Hypothesis 4). Because each of these three hypotheses 
(2, 3, and 4) refers back to the proposed “positive relation-
ship between CEO hubris and firm pollution” (Zhang et al. 
2020, pp. 463, 464), we focus on their central Hypothesis 1 
in the following.
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Regression Results
Zhang et al. (2020, p. 465) employ two operationaliza-
tions of CEO hubris: a “media-based evaluation method” 
(see their Tables 4 and 5) and a “salary-based evaluation 
method” (see their Table 6). Because the authors split the 
media-based evaluation method into a continuous measure 
(see their Table 4) and an ordered categorical measure (see 
their Table 5), the two operationalizations of CEO hubris 
ultimately yield three measures of CEO hubris in their study. 
CEO hubris is included in the following regression models: 
in Models 2 to 4, in Models 6 to 8, and in Models 10 to 
12.1 The continuous media-based measure is Zhang et al.’s 
(2020) choice to measure CEO hubris in Models 2 to 4 (see 
their Table 4). The authors use the other two measures of 
CEO hubris in their robustness tests as an alternative to their 
continuous media-based measure. The ordered categorical 
media-based measure is Zhang et al.’s (2020) choice to 
measure CEO hubris in their first robustness test in Models 
6 to 8 (see their Table 5). The salary-based measure is Zhang 
et al.’s (2020) choice to measure CEO hubris in their second 
robustness test in Models 10 to 12 (see their Table 6). As a 
consequence, Zhang et al. (2020) test their research hypoth-
eses with multiple regression models and present three clus-
ters of regression results in separate tables.
In total, Zhang et al. (2020) draw three inferences with 
regard to their Hypothesis 1 in their results section. First, the 
authors state the following on page 468:
“As shown in Table 4, hubris is positively and sig-
nificantly associated with firm pollution (β = 0.220, 
t = 2.625) in Model 2. The results suggest that firms 
with hubristic CEOs are associated with more frequent 
pollution. In terms of economic significance, the coef-
ficient estimate of 0.220 for CEO hubris in Model 2 of 
Table 4 suggests that one standard deviation (0.456, 
see Table 3) increase in hubris above the mean will 
increase firm pollution by 0.10 (0.220 × 0.456). 
Taking the mean firm pollution in our sample as the 
benchmark (0.644, see Table 3), the magnitude of 
this increase is substantial, about 15.5% (0.01/0.644). 
These data support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that 
CEO hubris is positively associated with firm pollu-
tion.”2
Second and in terms of their first robustness test, Zhang 
et al. (2020, p. 470) infer: “As shown in Models 6–8, the 
results are similar to our previous ones, indicating that the 
hypotheses are robust to alternative measurements of CEO 
hubris.” Third and in terms of their second robustness test, 
Zhang et al. (2020, p. 471) again infer: “As shown in Table 6, 
the results are still similar to previous ones.”
We argue that the authors’ first inference appears to be 
incomplete and that the authors’ second and third inference 
appear to be incorrect. In contrast to Zhang et al. (2020, 
p. 474), we infer from their regression results that, most 
importantly, both robustness tests (see their Tables 5 and 6) 
do not provide support for their central Hypothesis 1 and that 
the main regression (see their Table 4) provides less support 
for their central Hypothesis 1 than is claimed on page 468. 
Hence, we question and wish to rectify their conclusion that 
the “results showed that CEO hubris significantly leads to 
more firm pollution” (Zhang et al. 2020, p. 474; see Aks-
tinaite et al. 2019, p. 2). Next, we will address each of our 
three concerns and ultimately present our conclusion.
Concern 1
The regression coefficient, i.e., the effect size, and the 
p-value, indicating its significance, of CEO hubris in 
Model 3 are lower than in Model 2 (see their Table 4). The 
regression coefficient of CEO hubris is lower by 14.55% 
[(0.188–0.220)/0.220]. The p-value of CEO hubris is lower 
by 12.38% [(2.300–2.625)/2.625], which causes the p-value 
to change from p < 0.01 (***) to p < 0.05 (**). Zhang et al. 
(2020) on page 468 only refer to Model 2 in their evalua-
tion of Hypothesis 1. Which of the two regression models is 
better suited to assess Hypothesis 1? Model 3 differs from 
Model 2 in that it includes the three institutional variables—
i.e., state ownership, political connection, and industrial 
competition—as independent variables in the regression 
analysis. Bearing in mind that CEO hubris is the only inde-
pendent variable in the authors’ research framework (see 
their Fig. 1), Model 3 controls for these three institutional 
variables. Because CEO hubris does not affect these insti-
tutional variables, Model 3 does not bear any disadvantage 
from controlling for the three institutional variables. In fact, 
Model 3 alleviates concerns about omitted variable bias 
(Stock and Watson 2015). Building on Zhang et al.’s (2020, 
pp. 462–464) development of Hypotheses 2 to 4, the insti-
tutional environment has not only the potential to moderate 
the effect of CEO hubris on firm pollution but also to affect 
firm pollution directly. Indeed, state ownership is signifi-
cantly negatively (***p < 0.01) related to firm pollution in 
Model 3 (β = − 0.358, t = − 2.989), Model 7 (β = − 0.368, 
t = − 3.068), and Model 11 (β = − 0.360, t = − 2.982). At 
the same time, the institutional environment can be corre-
lated to CEO hubris: for example, the correlation between 
industrial competition and CEO hubris is minus 0.102 and 
marginally significant (*p < 0.1) (see their Table 3). Because 
Model 2 does not control for the institutional variables, it is 
thus susceptible to omitted variable bias (Stock and Watson 
1 Note that Models 5 and 9 are identical with Model 1.
2 There is a small typo on page 468 (Zhang et al. 2020): instead of 
“15.5% (0.01/0.644)” it should correctly read ‘15.5% (0.10/0.644)’.
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2015). To sum up, Model 3 is better suited than Model 2 
to evaluate Hypothesis 1. Correspondingly, Models 7 and 
11 are better suited than Models 6 and 10, respectively, to 
evaluate Hypothesis 1. To follow Zhang et al.’s (2020) line 
of argumentation, we focus on Models 6 and 10 in the next 
two paragraphs (Concern 2 and 3). Our claims in these para-
graphs are, however, robust in terms of switching to Models 
7 and 11.
Concern 2
The first robustness test of Zhang et al. (2020) does not pro-
vide support for their central Hypothesis 1. As indicated 
above, the authors use the regression results of Model 2 
(main regression test) to argue that CEO hubris has a sig-
nificant positive effect on firm pollution. Zhang et al. (2020) 
are, however, silent on Model 6 from their first robustness 
test (see their Table 5), which differs from Model 2 only in 
the measurement of CEO hubris. In Model 6, CEO hubris 
is no longer measured continuously but measured by the 
media-based ordered categorical proxy. Importantly, the 
CEO hubris measure of Models 6 to 8 is thereby identical 
with the main measure of Tang et al. (2015a, b), which adds 
to the credibility of Models 6 to 8. In contrast to Model 2, 
CEO hubris in Model 6 is negatively, yet not significantly, 
associated with firm pollution (β = –0.0601, t = –0.822). In 
contrast to Model 2, the null hypothesis that CEO hubris 
has no effect on firm pollution (β = 0) cannot be rejected. In 
contrast to Model 2, Model 6 even hints at a negative effect 
of CEO hubris on firm pollution. In light of such differ-
ences, we are concerned about Zhang et al.’s (2020, p. 470) 
statement that “[a]s shown in Models 6–8, the results are 
similar to our previous ones, indicating that the hypotheses 
are robust to alternative measurements of CEO hubris.” To 
sum up, Model 6 of the first robustness test questions the 
reliability of the results of Model 2 for assessing Hypoth-
esis 1. In this regard, the first robustness test fails to provide 
robustness.
Concern 3
The second robustness test of Zhang et al. (2020) does also 
not provide support for their central Hypothesis 1. Zhang 
et al. (2020) are silent on Model 10 (see their Table 6), 
which differs from Models 2 and 6 only in the measure-
ment of CEO hubris. In Model 10, CEO hubris is no longer 
measured by the media-based proxy but instead by the 
salary-based proxy to again “ensure the reliability of the 
results” (Zhang et al. 2020, p. 469). In contrast to Model 2, 
CEO hubris in Model 10 is not significantly associated with 
firm pollution (β = 0.338, t = 0.947). Once again, the null 
hypothesis that CEO hubris has no effect on firm pollution 
(β = 0) cannot be rejected. In light of such differences, we are 
concerned about Zhang et al.’s (2020, p. 471) statement that 
“[a]s shown in Table 6, the results are still similar to previ-
ous ones.” To sum up, Model 10 of the second robustness 
test also questions the reliability of the results of Model 2 for 
assessing Hypothesis 1. In this regard, the second robustness 
test fails to provide robustness, too.
After all, do the regression results support Zhang et al.’s 
(2020) central Hypothesis 1? In conclusion, Zhang et al. 
(2020, p. 462) do not provide convincing regression results 
on their hypothesized relationship that “CEO hubris is posi-
tively related to firm pollution” (see Akstinaite et al. 2019, 
p. 2). This underlines the importance of considering the 
main test and the two “robustness tests” (Zhang et al. 2020, 
p. 469) carefully, which did not provide robustness regard-
ing the evaluation of the authors’ central Hypothesis 1. As 
outlined by Chen, Crossland, and Luo (2015, p. 1521), it 
is crucial to “ensure that the findings in [a] study are not 
being driven by the idiosyncrasies of any specific measure.” 
For now, the null hypothesis that CEO hubris has no effect 
on firm pollution (β = 0) still seems to hold, so that more 
research is necessary to explore the truly intriguing rela-
tionship between CEO hubris and firm pollution including 
moderating and mediating variables.
Operationalization of CEO Hubris
We agree with Zhang et al. (2020, p. 465) that one of the 
“key issues” in their study is to operationalize CEO hubris. 
Roll (1986) introduced the concept of managerial hubris to 
explain value-destroying corporate takeovers. Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997, p. 106) started conceptualizing managerial 
hubris and used people’s everyday understanding of it, i.e., 
“exaggerated pride or self-confidence.” On the one hand, 
later publications in the literature repeated Hayward and 
Hambrick’s (1997) preliminary conceptualization and did 
not improve it such as Li and Tang (2010) or Tang et al. 
(2018). On the other hand, Hiller and Hambrick (2005) 
developed it further and still provide the most rigorous and 
in-depth conceptualization of executive hubris. They con-
ceptualized it as “hyper-core self-evaluation” (hyper-CSE) 
comprising four dimensions (Hiller and Hambrick 2005, p. 
297): self-esteem, self-efficacy, locus of control, and emo-
tional stability (Judge et al. 2002). In this regard, Hiller and 
Hambrick (2005, pp. 297, 298) summarized the field’s pro-
gress: “A chief obstacle has been the absence of any rig-
orous conceptual apparatus for conducting such inquiries. 
The few attempts to explore executive self-potency have 
invoked an array of disconnected concepts, including […] 
colloquial concepts that, despite intuitive appeal, lack rigor-
ous psychological and methodological grounding (hubris) 
(Hayward and Hambrick 1997).” In terms of the resulting 
measurement (see Li and Tang 2010, p. 63), the following 
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two exemplary studies provided promising multi-dimen-
sional operationalizations of managerial hubris. To begin 
with, Park et al. (2018, pp. 925, 926) employed a three-
part operationalization that comprised media praise, award 
records, and vocabulary in CEO letters. A “composite meas-
ure of CEO hubris [was derived] from factor analysis of the 
three hubris indicators” (Park et al. 2018, p. 926). Second, 
Arena, Michelon, and Trojanowski (2018, p. 324) employed 
a three-part operationalization that comprised relative com-
pensation, photo in annual report, and a media-based indi-
cator of confidence. Arena et al. (2018, p. 324) stated: “We 
improve upon previous studies and combine some of the 
most widespread metrics for CEO hubris. Specifically, we 
obtain our summary measure of CEO hubris through a prin-
cipal component analysis of the three proxies.” McManus 
(2018, p. 177) employed two additional potentially promis-
ing proxies, i.e., length of biography and being a founding 
member of the firm, which could also be used to construct 
multi-dimensional operationalizations of managerial hubris 
Zhang et al. (2020) employ two, only one-dimensional, oper-
ationalizations of CEO hubris: a media-based and a salary-
based evaluation method. Due to the critical importance of 
how Zhang et al. (2020) measure the study’s independent 
variable, we revisit and clarify their two operationalizations 
of CEO hubris next (Suddaby 2010).
First, the authors’ media-based evaluation method uses 
CEO press coverage and was introduced by Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) to study the effect of CEO overconfidence on 
corporate merger decisions. In the meantime, this proxy for 
overconfidence has been adopted by other studies, too (e.g., 
Chen et al. 2015; Hirshleifer et al. 2012). Hence, it is impor-
tant to clarify that Zhang et al.’s (2020) first operationaliza-
tion of CEO hubris measures overconfidence, which is “the 
overestimation of outcomes related to own abilities (such 
as IQ or managerial skills)” (Malmendier and Tate 2008, 
p. 22).3 While (finance) scholars, such as Malmendier and 
Tate (2008), often used the term ‘hubris’ as a synonym for 
‘overconfidence’ (Tang et al. 2018), Hiller and Hambrick’s 
(2005) conceptualization of executive hubris for manage-
ment literature differentiates between hubris and overconfi-
dence. Hubris is a psychological trait (orientation), whereas 
overconfidence is a cognitive bias (Tang et al. 2018; see Li 
and Tang 2010, pp. 45, 46). Overconfidence accounts for 
only one part of managerial hubris and corresponds with 
a very high level of self-efficacy, which is one of hubris’ 
four dimensions (Hiller and Hambrick 2005). Relatedly, 
Zhang et al. (2020) misstate the titles of four articles (Brown 
and Sarma 2007; Chen et al. 2015; Hribar and Yang 2016; 
Malmendier and Tate 2008) from their methodology and 
results sections in their reference list. Each time the authors 
replace ‘overconfidence’ in the original title by ‘hubris’ in 
their referenced title. For example: Instead of “Who makes 
acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reac-
tion” (Malmendier and Tate 2008, p. 20), Zhang et al. (2020, 
p. 477) state “Who makes acquisitions? CEO hubris and the 
market’s reaction.” We ask for a thorough use of the related, 
yet distinct, terms of hubris and overconfidence.
Second, the authors’ salary-based evaluation method uses 
CEO relative compensation data to develop a proxy for exec-
utive hubris. Zhang et al. (2020, pp. 470, 471) state: “Fol-
lowing Jiang et al. (2011), we used the salary of the CEO 
divided by the salary of the top three executives as a proxy 
for CEO hubris.”4 Hayward and Hambrick (1997, p. 114) 
in their seminal paper on executive hubris and corporate 
acquisitions explained that “CEO relative compensation [is] 
a measure of CEO self-importance.” They calculated CEO 
relative compensation very similarly to Zhang et al. (2020) 
as “CEO cash compensation divided by the compensation 
of the second-highest-paid officer” (Hayward and Hambrick 
1997, p. 114). Importantly, self-importance accounts for 
only one part of managerial hubris and corresponds with 
a very high level of self-esteem, which is one of hubris’ 
four dimensions (Hiller and Hambrick 2005). In addition, 
Zhang et al.’s (2020) salary-based proxy also forms a part 
of Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007, p. 363) five-item proxy 
for CEO narcissism. More specifically, Zhang et al.’s (2020) 
salary-based proxy corresponds conceptually with the last 
two items of Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007, p. 363) 
proxy for CEO narcissism: “(4) the CEO’s cash compensa-
tion divided by that of the second-highest paid executive in 
the firm; and (5) the CEO’s non-cash compensation divided 
by that of the second-highest-paid executive in the firm.” 
Importantly, Tang et al. (2018) in their analysis of the differ-
ent effects of narcissism versus hubris in the context of cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) found a positive effect of 
CEO narcissism on CSR and a negative effect of CEO hubris 
on CSR. Hence, the overlap of the salary-based proxy of 
Zhang et al. (2020) with Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007) 
proxy for CEO narcissism (potentially) helps to explain why 
the regression coefficient of the central independent variable 
in Model 6, “CEO hubris” (Zhang et al. 2020, p. 472), is no 
longer statistically significant in contrast to Model 2 (see 
their Tables 4 and 5).
To sum up, Zhang et al.’s (2020) salary-based operation-
alization of CEO hubris is conceptually distinct from their 
3 Optimism, by contrast, is “the overestimation of exogenous out-
comes (such as the growth of the US economy)” (Malmendier and 
Tate 2008, p. 22).
4 As a side note, Jiang et al. (2011, p. 492) themselves use the term 
‘overconfidence’ instead of hubris to explain their measure: “we use 
the CEO’s relative salary as the second measure of managerial over-
confidence.”
415CEO Hubris and Firm Pollution: A Tricky Relationship 
1 3
media-based operationalization of CEO hubris: self-impor-
tance (very high levels of self-esteem) versus overconfidence 
(very high levels of self-efficacy). Hence, each of the two 
operationalizations of Zhang et al. (2020) measure only one, 
albeit important, dimension of the four dimensions of CEO 
hubris (Hiller and Hambrick 2005). Both operationalizations 
of CEO hubris neglect high levels of emotional stability and 
locus of control (Hiller and Hambrick 2005, p. 300). As a 
consequence, it is especially fruitful to analyze and compare 
the respective regression results (see our last section above).
Final Remarks
Starting with Roll (1986), several studies have raised aware-
ness for the concept of managerial hubris (e.g., Haynes et al. 
2015; Hayward et al. 2006; Tang et al. 2015a, b). In this 
commentary on the recent article “CEO Hubris and Firm 
Pollution: State and Market Contingencies in a Transitional 
Economy” of Zhang et al. (2020) in this journal, we hope to 
contribute to the literature on managerial hubris in two ways. 
First, we repair the authors’ inferences and conclusions 
about the actual effect of CEO hubris on firm pollution with 
respect to their conflicting regression results. Second, we 
unpack and clarify the authors’ vulnerable operationalization 
of CEO hubris. On a separate note, we wish to highlight that 
Zhang et al. (2020) discover—but do not mention—a signifi-
cant correlation between CEO hubris and CEO duality (see 
Li and Tang 2010, p. 54) as well as a marginally significant 
correlation between CEO hubris and industrial competition 
(see their Table 3). These correlations provide promising, 
yet tentative, hunches for our emerging understanding of 
antecedents and effects of CEO hubris (Picone et al. 2014). 
We hope that our commentary will inspire more research on 
the (tricky) relationship between CEO hubris and firm pollu-
tion, and managerial hubris more generally. We thank Zhang 
and colleagues for stimulating this important conversation.
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